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Abstract
How much income would a woman living alone require to attain the
same standard of living that she would have if she were married?
What percentage of a married couple’s expenditures are controlled
by the husband? How much money does a couple save on consump-
tion goods by living together versus living apart? We propose and
estimate a collective model of household behavior that permits iden-
tification and estimation of concepts such as these. We model house-
holds in terms of the utility functions of its members, a bargaining or
social welfare function, and a consumption technology function. We
demonstrate generic nonparametric identification of the model, and
hence of equivalence scales, consumption economies of scale, house-
hold members’ bargaining power and other related concepts.
1 Introduction
On average, how much income would a woman living alone require to attain the
same standard of living that she would have if she were married? What percentage
of a married couple’s expenditures benefit the husband? How much money does
a couple save on consumption goods by living together versus living apart? The
goal of this paper is to propose a collective model of household behavior aimed at
answering questions such as these.1
Equivalence scales revisited Questions like these are traditionally addressed
using equivalence scales. Our approach is crucially different. Equivalence scales
seek to answer the question, “how much money does a household need to spend
to be as well off as a single person living alone?” The equivalence scale itself is
then the expenditures of the household divided by the expenditures of the single
1A large literature exists on specification and estimation of ordinary demand systems, collective
and household bargaining models, and on identification (and lack thereof) of equivalence scales,
bargaining power measures, consumption economies scale, and other related household welfare
measures. Some surveys of this literature include Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), Blundell (1988),
Browning (1992), Pollak and Wales (1992), Blundell, Preston, and Walker (1994), Blackorby
and Donaldson (1994), Bourguignon and Chiappori (1994), Lewbel (1997), Jorgenson (1997),
Slesnick (1998), and Vermeulen (2000).
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person that enjoys the same “standard of living” as the household.2 The early
equivalence scale literature attempted to define this ratio of costs of living directly
in terms of measurable quantities such as the costs of acquiring a required number
of calories, but this was soon replaced by the concept of defining the household
and the single person as equally well off to mean that they attain an equal level
of utility (see, e.g., Jorgenson and Slesnick 1987, and for a survey, Lewbel 1997).
Just as a true cost of living price index measures the ratio of costs of attaining the
same utility level under different price regimes, equivalence scales were supposed
to measure the ratio of costs of attaining the same utility level under different
household compositions.
Unfortunately, unlike true cost of living indexes, equivalence scales defined in
this way can never be identified from revealed preference data (that is, from the
observed expenditures of households under different price and income regimes).
The reason is that defining a household to have the same utility level as a single
individual requires that the utility functions of the household and of the single in-
dividual be comparable. We cannot avoid this problem by defining the household
and the single to be equally well off when they attain the same indifference curve,
analogous to the construction of true cost of living indices, because the house-
hold and the single have different preferences and hence do not possess the same
indifference curves. Pollak and Wales (1979, 1992) describe these identification
problems in detail, while Blundell and Lewbel (1991) prove that only changes in
traditional equivalence scales, but not their levels, can be identified by revealed
preference.3
We argue that the source of these identification problems is that the standard
equivalence scale question is badly posed, for two reasons. First, by definition any
comparison between the preferences of two distinct decision units entails interper-
2Equivalence scales have many practical applications. They are commonly used for generating
poverty lines for households of various compositions given a poverty line for single males. Income
inequality measures have been applied to equivalence scaled income rather than observed income
to adjust for household composition.(see, e.g., Jorgenson 1997). Calculation of appropriate levels
for alimony or life insurance also require comparing costs of living for couples versus those of
singles.
3Many previous attempts to identify equivalence scales are based on assumptions such as Inde-
pendence of Base (IB) or Equivalence Scale Exactness (see, e.g., Lewbel (1989)). Jorgenson and
Slesnick’s (1987) model is a special case of an IB assumption. IB imposes testable restrictions on
demands, but it also requires untestable (that is, cardinal or comparable utility type) restrictions.
IB is an example of the paradigm of comparing an individuals’s utility to that of a household,
which is intrinsically impossible without some cardinalization or interpersonal comparability of
utility.
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sonal utility comparisons. Second, and perhaps more fundamental, the notion of
a household utility is potentially flawed. Individuals have utility, not households.
What is relevant is not the ’preferences’ of a given household, but rather the pref-
erences of the individuals that compose it.
We propose therefore that meaningful comparisons must be undertaken at the
individual level, and that the appropriate question to ask is, “how much income
would an individual living alone need to attain the same indifference curve over
goods that the individual attains as a member of the household?” This latter ques-
tion avoids issues of interpersonal comparability and differences in indifference
curves (it only depends on ordinal preferences), and hence is at least in principle
answerable from revealed preference data. Consequently, in sharp contrast with
the existing equivalence scale literature, our framework does not assume the exis-
tence of a unique household utility function, nor does it require comparability of
utility between individuals and groups (such as the household). Instead, follow-
ing the basic ideas of the collective approach to household behavior, we assume
that each individual is characterized by his/her own utility function, so the only
comparisons we make is between the same person’s welfare in different living
arrangements.
A New Collective Model An obvious practical obstacle to implementing our
new approach to equivalence scales is the difficulty of observing individual con-
sumptions within a household and the intra-household allocation of resources. In
general, only household’s total purchases are observed, and not their distribution
and use among members. This raises three questions. First, one has to identify
individual preferences. Secondly, since the distribution of resources within the
household is not recorded, it has to be identified from the aggregate household
demand - a standard problem of the collective literature. Finally, household con-
sumption entails shared consumption, and hence economies of scale and scope
in consumption. As a result, in a typical multiperson household individual con-
sumptions add up to ‘more’ than total purchases. This sharing and jointness of
consumption is not directly observed, and must also be identified.
The solution to this problem obviously depends on the nature of available data.
For instance, if each individual household member’s consumption were observed,
identification of each member’s indifference curves could proceed along standard
lines. In this paper we assume, as usual, that only the household’s aggregate
consumption of various goods (and their prices) are observable.
For both identification and empirical tractability, we characterize the jointness
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of consumption and the allocation of resources within a household by what we call
the consumption technology function and the sharing rule4. The idea of the con-
sumption technology function is that features of household consumption such as
economies of scale or scope, joint use of resources, etc., can be defined as a tech-
nology that describes the set of options for the joint consumption of goods that
are available to household members. The distinction between public and private
goods within a household in the existing collective models literature (see, e.g.,
Vermeulen 2000) is a special case of our consumption technology function (see
Section 5 for details). The consumption technology function is similar to Becker’s
(1965) notion of household production, with differences being that we extend it to
a collective framework, and that what is produced (by sharing and joint consump-
tion) is effectively an increase in the quantities of purchased goods. We argue that
this extension significantly changes the status of the household production con-
cept, and in particular its identifiability. While the household production function
is typically unidentifiable in a unitary framework, we show a general identification
result for the technology function in the collective setting. The consumption tech-
nology function is also closely related to the motivations behind Barten (1964)
scales and Gorman’s (1976) general linear technologies.
The sharing rule describes the allocation of resources within the household.
The concept of a sharing rule is borrowed directly from the collective approach
(see Chiappori 1992, Browning and Chiappori 1998, and Vermeulen 2000 for a
survey). Specifically our sharing rule is derived from the assumption that house-
hold decisions are Pareto efficient and that individual consumptions (after conver-
sion from purchased quantities by the consumption technology function) are pri-
vate5. Considering the household as a small, open economy, by the second welfare
theorem any efficient outcome can be decentralized as an equilibrium, possibly
after lump sum transfers between members. The sharing rule summarizes those
transfers, and can thus be seen as a reduced form of the decision process regarding
the distribution of resources within the household.
Our collective based equivalence scales do not impose particular assumptions
on this intra-household distribution of resources. In particular, we do not assume
that all household members are equally well off. Household resources could result
from bargaining models or more generally from any household allocation process
4Like all the other concepts we define, including our version of equivalence scales, the sharing
rule and the consumption technology function are purely ordinal, and so do not depend on any
chosen cardinalization of individual utility functions.
5The privateness assumption can be relaxed by a generalization of the household technology.
See Section 5 for a precise discussion.
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that does not violate efficiency.
In our model, aggregate household demand functions are determined by the
sharing rule, the consumption technology function, and the preferences of the
individual household members. All of these functions must be identified to cor-
rectly evaluate consumption economies of scale, household bargaining power, and
appropriately defined equivalence scales.
To facilitate this identification we assume, at least initially, that individual or-
dinal preferences do not change after marriage6. This allows us to use the demand
data of people living alone to identify individual preferences, thereby leaving to
household data the job of identifying the consumption technology and sharing
rule. Discussion of how this assumption may be relaxed within our methodology
is defered to section 57. This assumption is not as restrictive as it seems, specif-
ically, it does not imply that household consumption equals the simple sum of
members demands, because of the consumption technology function.
The collective approach to equivalence scales The consumption technology
function transforms the n vector of purchased quantities of goods and services z
into an n vector of private good equivalents x . The greater the degree of economies
of scale in consumption of a component of z, the larger is the corresponding com-
ponent of x . These private good equivalents are then divided up between the
household members via a household welfare or bargaining function, with each
member deriving utility from consuming their share of x . The sharing rule sum-
marizes this division of x among household members.
In this framework, we define a collective based equivalent income (or expen-
diture) to be the income or total expenditure level yi∗ required by an individual i ,
when living alone, to be as well off materially as he or she would be when living
with others in a household that has joint income y. Member i’s collective based
equivalence scale is then y/yi∗, the ratio of the household’s total expenditures to
member i’s collective based equivalent total expenditures.
To see the usefulness of collective based equivalent income, consider the ques-
6Of course, the utility levelmay be shifted by marriage; we simply assume that the individual’s
indifference curves are unchanged.
7What we require is some method of identifying the indifference curves describing the pref-
erences over goods of individuals within households. The simplest solution is to assume they
are the same as for singles living alone. More complicated solutions will require either explicit
models of changes in preferences resulting from marriage, or some combination of stronger mod-
eling assumptions and richer data sets from which the indifference curves of individual household
members may be directly recovered.
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tion of determining an appropriate level of life insurance for a spouse. If the cou-
ple spends y dollars per year then for the wife to maintain the same standard of
living after the husband dies, she will need an insurance policy that pays enough
to permit spending y f ∗ dollars per year. Similarly, in cases of wrongful death, ju-
ries are instructed to assess damages both to compensate for the loss in “standard
of living,” (i.e., yi∗) and, separately for “pain and suffering,” which would pre-
sumably be noneconomic effects (see Lewbel 2003). Another example is poverty
lines. If the poverty lines for individuals have been established, then the poverty
line for a couple should be defined as the expenditures required for each member
of the couple to attain his or her own poverty line indifference curve.
Traditional equivalence scales do not properly answer these questions, because
they attempt to relate the utility of an individual to that of a household, instead of
relating the utility of the same individual in two different settings, e.g. living with
a husband versus without8.
Identification and Estimation An important result we show is that, given the
in principle observable consumption demands of individual household members
(which we estimate from the demands of singles given our data limitations) and
the demand functions of aggregate households, a household’s sharing rule, con-
sumption technology function, and collective based equivalence scales are all non-
parametrically identified, without any assumptions regarding interpersonal com-
parability or utility cardinalizations. The sharing rule (which we show has a one to
one relationship to relative bargaining power) and household economies of scale
are similarly nonparametrically identified9.
We also provide duality results that yield a convenient way to parameterize
the household’s behavior for empirical analysis, analogous to the use of indirect
utility functions to conveniently parameterize ordinary empirical demand func-
tions. These duality results include specification of an income sharing function
in place of the direct bargaining or social welfare function, and specification of
the consumption technology in a form that is analogous to Barten (1964) scales or
8This is similar to the distinction Pollak and Wales (1992) make between what they call a
welfare comparison versus a situation comparison.
9The household consumption technology function is used to construct measures of the
economies of scale that results from joint consumption within the household. When a couple
buys the bundle z at a cost p)z, it is equivalent in terms of consumption to two singles living apart
who in total buy the larger bundle x , which would cost p)x . The economies of scale from joint
consumption is then p)z/p)x , which equals the cost savings, in percentage terms, that results from
shared consumption.
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Gorman’s (1976) general linear technology.
Finally, we provide an empirical application of our model using the Canadian
FAMEX survey. The results are used to calculate estimates of equivalence scales
and economies of scale of married couples versus their single counterparts.
The next section describes the basic framework and summarizes the main the-
oretical results of the paper, for the most part using the special case of linear tech-
nologies for clarity. Later sections then provide more formal derivations, describe
our empirical implementation of the model, and discuss possible extensions and
variants.
2 The Model
This section describes the proposed household model. Let superscripts refer to
household members and subscripts refer to goods. Let Ui(xi) be the direct utility
function for a consumer i , consuming the vector of goods xi = (xi1, ..., xin). We
consider households consisting of two members, which we will for convenience
refer to as the husband (i = m) and the wife (i = f ). For many applications, it
may be useful to interpret one of these utility functions as a joint utility function
for all but one member of the household, e.g.,U f could be the joint utility function
of a wife and her children.
2.1 Singles
When living alone, household member i maximizes a monotonically increas-
ing, continuously twice differentiable and strictly quasi-concave utility function
Ui(zi ) when facing the n vector of prices p with income level yi . Hence i solves
the optimization program
max
zi
U i(zi) subject to p)zi = yi (Pi )
Let zi = hi(p/yi ) denote the solution to this individual optimization program, so
the vector valued function hi is the set of Marshallian demands of member i when
living alone. Define V i by
V i(p/yi ) = Ui [hi(p/yi)] (1)
so V i is the indirect utility function of member i when living alone. The functional
form of individual demand functions hi can be obtained from a specification of
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V i using Roy’s identity. The Marshallian demand functions hm and h f may be
estimated using ordinary demand data on observed prices, total expenditures, and
quantities purchased for individuals living alone.
2.2 Households: decision process
Now consider a household consisting of a couple living together, and facing the
budget constraint p)z ≤ y, where p is a vector of market prices. Following
the standard collective approach, our key assumption regarding decision making
within the household is that outcomes are Pareto efficient. This, assuming the
absence of money illusion in the decision process, is equivalent to the existence
of some increasing function HU [U f (x f ),Um(xm), p/y] that is maximized under
budget and technology constraints. In what follows, we assume for convenience
that HU is twice differentiable. It is important to note that HU may in general de-
pend on prices. Thus, HU can be interpreted as a social welfare function for the
household, in which individual weights may vary with prices. Alternatively, HU
may stem from some specific bargaining model (Nash bargaining for instance).
All of the functions we define may depend on other variables that we have sup-
pressed for notational simplicity. For example, the bargaining function HU might
depend on the relative wages of the household members, and the utility functions
U f and Um might depend on demographic characteristics.
A standard result of welfare theory is that one can, without loss of generality,
write the function HU asµ(p/y)U f (x f )+Um(xm) for some functionµ(p/y). The
Pareto weight µ(p/y) can be seen as a measure of f ’s influence in the decision
process. The larger the value of µ is, the greater is the weight that member f ’s
preferences receive in the resulting household program, and the greater will be the
resulting private equivalent quantities x f versus xm . One difficulty with using µ
as a measure of the weight given to (or the bargaining power of) member f is that
the magnitude of µ will depend on the arbitrary cardinalizations of the functions
U f and Um . Later we will propose an alternative bargaining power measure that
does not depend upon any cardinalizations.
2.3 The Consumption Technology Function
As stated in introduction, the household purchases some bundle z, but individual
consumptions add up to some other bundle x . In the technological relation z =
F(x), we can interpret z as the inputs and x as the outputs in the household’s
consumption technology, described by the production function F−1, though what
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is being ’produced’ is consumption. This framework is similar to a Becker (1965)
type household production model, except that instead of using market goods to
produce commodities that contribute to utility, the household essentially produces
the equivalent of a greater quantity of market goods via sharing. The unobserved
n vectors x f , xm , and x = x f + xm are private good equivalent vectors, that is,
they are respectively the quantities of transformed goods that are consumed by the
female, the male, and in total.
It will often be convenient to work with a linear consumption technology,
which is
F(x) = Ax + a (2)
where A is a nonsingular n by n matrix and a is a n vector. This linear con-
sumption technology has an analogous interpretation to Gorman’s (1976) linear
technology (a special case of which is Barten (1964) scaling), except that we ap-
ply it in the context of a collective model.
Consider some simple examples. Let good j be food. Suppose that if an
individual or a couple buy a quantity of food z j , the then total amount of food that
the individual or couple can actually consume (that is, get utility from) is z j − a j ,
where a j is waste in food preparation, spoilage, etc.,. If the individuals lived apart,
each would waste an amount a j , so the total amount wasted would be 2a j , while
living together results in only a waste of a j . In this simple example the economies
of scale to food consumption from living together is a reduction in waste from 2a j
to a j , implying that x j = z j + a j , so the consumption technology function for
food takes the simple form z j = Fj (x) = x j − a j .
Economies of scale also arise directly from sharing. For example, let good
j be automobile use. If x fj and x
m
j are the distances traveled by each household
member in the car (or some consumed good that is proportional to distance, per-
haps gasoline), then the total distance the car travels is z = (x fj + xmj )/(1 + r),
where r is the fraction of distance that the couple ride together, which yields a con-
sumption technology function for automobile use of z j = Fj(x) = x j/(1 + r).
This example is similar to the usual motivation for Barten (1964) scales, but it
is operationally more complicated, because Barten scales fail to distinguish the
separate utility functions, and hence the separate consumptions, of the household
members.
More complicated consumption technologies can arise in a variety of ways.
The fraction of time r that the couple share the car could depend on the total usage,
resulting in Fj being a nonlinear function of x j . There could also be economies
(or diseconomies) of scope as well as scale in the consumption technology, e.g.,
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the shared travel time percentage r could be related to expenditures on vacations,
resulting in Fj (x) being a function of other elements of x in addition to x j .
2.4 The basic program
Our proposed model of this household’s consumption behavior is thus the opti-
mization program
max
x f ,xm,z
HU [U f (x f ),Um(xm), p/y] (P∗)
x = x f + xm , z = F(x), p)z = y
where z is the vector of quantities of the n goods the household purchases, p is
market prices and y is the household’s total expenditures.
The solution of the program (P∗) yields the household’s demand functions,
which we denote as z = h(p/y), and also private good equivalent demand func-
tions xi = xi(p/y). The vector valued demand function z = h (p/y) can be
estimated using ordinary demand data on observed prices, incomes, and quanti-
ties purchased by the couple.
One way to interpret the program P∗ is to consider two extreme cases. If all
goods were private and there were no shared or joint consumption, then F(x) = x ,
so z would equal x f+xm and the program P∗ would reduce to maxx f ,z HU [U f (x f ),Um(z−
x f ), p/y] such that p)z = y, which is exactly equivalent to a standard specifica-
tion of the collective model (see, e.g., Bourguignon and Chiappori 1994 or Ver-
meulen 2000). At the other extreme, imagine a household that has a consumption
technology function F , but assume that the household’s utility function for trans-
formed goods just equaled Um(x), as might happen if the male were a dictator
that forced the other household member to consume goods in the same propor-
tion that he does. In that case, the model would reduce to maxz Um[F−1(z)] such
that p)z = y, which for linear F is equivalent to Gorman’s (1976) general linear
technology model, a special case of which is Barten (1964) scales (corresponding
to A diagonal and a zero).10 Our general model, program P∗, combines the con-
sumption technology logic of the Gorman or Barten framework with the collective
model of a household as either a bargaining or a social welfare maximizing group.
It should be stressed that ifUm andU f are the utility functions of singles, the
model permits changes in utility to result from living together, provided they are
10Gorman’s (1976) famous line, ”If I have a wife and child, a penny bun costs threepence,”
rationalizes Barten scales but implicitly assumes a dictator imposing his taste for buns on his
family members.
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separable from goods consumption. For instance, one could be generally happier
as a result of living with a spouse, and a wife’s utility could depend on both her
own attained utility level over goods (the value of U f ) and on Um . These effects
are absorbed into the function HU .11
For our identification and empirical results, we use data on single men and
women to estimate the Marshallian demand functions h f and hm arising from the
utility functions Um and U f , and the married couple’s demand functions z =
h(p/y) derived from the program P∗. These estimates are combined to identify
the consumption technology function F and relevant features of the bargaining
or social welfare function HU , which in turn yields estimates of the private good
equivalents x f and xm , the sharing rule, economies of scale from consumption,
and the collective based equivalence scales associated with any price and income
regime.
2.5 The Form of Household Demands
Consider the household as an open economy. From the second welfare theo-
rem, any Pareto efficient allocation can be implemented as an equilibrium of this
economy, possibly after lump sum transfers between members. Transfers can be
summarized by the sharing rule η(p/y), describing the fraction of household re-
sources consumed by member f . The household’s behavior is equivalent to allo-
cating the fraction η f = η(p/y) to member f , and the fraction ηm = 1− η(p/y)
to member m. Each member i then maximizes their own utility functionUi given
the shadow price vector π and their own shadow income ηi to calculate their de-
sired private good equivalent consumption vectors x f and xm.
Formally:
Proposition 1 There exists a shadow price vector π(p/y) and a scalar valued
sharing rule η(p/y), with 0 ≤ η(p/y) ≤ 1, such that the solution to program P∗
satisfies
x f (p/y) = h f
tπ(p/y)
η(p/y)
u
xm(p/y) = hm
t π(p/y)
1− η(p/y)
u
(3)
z = h(p/y) = F[x f (p/y)+ xm(p/y)]
11In addition, as will be discussed later, the consumption technology function F can capture
some kinds of taste changes that result from living together.
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This and other propositions are proved in the Appendix. Here, π (p/y) de-
notes the equilibrium (shadow) prices within the household economy. In general,
these shadow prices will depend in a complicated way on the consumption tech-
nology function and both members demand functions. However, π (p/y) has a
simple tractable functional form that only depends on the consumption technol-
ogy when the technology is linear, as follows.
Proposition 2 If the consumption technology function is linear, so z = F(x) =
Ax + a then the functions π(p/y) and h(p/y) in Proposition 1 are given by
π(p/y) = A
) p
y − a) p
z = h(p/y) = Ah f
t
A) p
y − a) p
1
η(p/y)
u
+ Ahm
t
A) p
y − a) p
1
1− η(p/y)
u
+a (4)
Note that the total shadow income of the household is π )(x f + xm) = 1, and
the sharing rule η is given by η = π )x f , which is the fraction of total shadow
income consumed by member f . It follows that η(p/y) is a direct measure of the
weight given to member f in the outcome of the household decision process.
Proposition 3 There is a one to one, strictly monotonic relationship between the
Pareto weight µ and the sharing rule η, which can be written as
µ = −

∂V f (πη )
∂η

/

∂Vm( π1−η)
∂η

An advantage of the sharing rule measure η is that (unlike µ) it does not de-
pend on any chosen cardinalization of utility. Also, unlike Browning and Chiap-
pori (1998), who find using household data alone that relative bargaining power
measures can only be identified up to an arbitrary location, we show in our model
that by combining data from households and from singles living alone, η is com-
pletely identified.
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3 Applications
Here we summarize some potential uses for our model of household consump-
tion behavior. These uses are in addition to the standard applications of demand
models, such as evaluation of price and income elasticities. One immediate use
of the results is the estimate of the sharing rule η as discussed in the previous sec-
tion. Other applications are measures of economies of scale and adult equivalence
scales.
3.1 Economies of Scale in Consumption
Previous attempts to measure economies of scale in consumption have required
very restrictive assumptions regarding the preferences of household members (see,
e.g., Nelson 1988). In contrast, given estimates of the private good equivalents
vector x = x f + xm from our model, we may calculate y/p)x , which is a mea-
sure of the overall economies of scale from living together, since y is what the
household spends to buy z and p)x would be the cost of buying the private good
equivalents of z. This economy of scale measure takes the form
y
p)x
=
y
p)
b
h f [π/η]+ hm[π/(1− η)]
c .
The measure relates the household’s total expenditures to the total cost of in-
dependently purchasing the same individual consumptions. It is important to note
that this measure does not directly provide an estimate of adult equivalence scales.
The reason is that, in general, the shadow prices used within the household are
not proportional to market prices (this is exactly Barten’s intuition). It follows
that individuals living alone would not buy the bundles x f and xm . They could
in general reach a higher level of utility by purchasing and consuming a different
combination.
3.2 Adult Equivalence Scales
Given each household member i’s private good equivalents xi , we define member
i’s collective based equivalent income, yi∗, as the minimum expenditures required
to buy a vector of goods that is on the same member i indifference curve as xi . The
ratio of y/yi∗ is then our collective model based adult equivalence scale, since y
is what the household spends to get member i onto the same indifference curve
over goods that he or she could attain while living alone with an income level
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of yi∗. Like the above described economies of scale and bargaining power mea-
sures, these equivalence scales do not depend on arbitrary utility cardinalizations
or assumptions of interpersonally comparable utility.
Recall that V i (p/yi) is the indirect utility function of member i when living
alone, and the private good equivalent vector consumed by member i while in the
household is xi(p/y) = hi
d
π(p/y)/ηi(p/y)
e
, where η f (p/y) = η(p/y) and
ηm(p/y) = 1− η(p/y). Then yi∗(p, y) is defined as the solution to the equation
V i
t
p
yi∗(p, y)
u
= V i
tπ(p/y)
ηi (p/y)
u
(5)
This definition is ordinal, i.e., it does not depend on the chosen cardinalization
for member i’s utility function. In applications with linear technologies, func-
tional forms for V i and ηi could be directly specified and π given by Proposition
2.
Given yi∗(p, y), we may calculate equivalence scales y/yi∗(p, y) or the dif-
ference in income required, y− yi∗(p, y). For example, at prices p, the quantity y
equals the amount of money that the household must spend so that the man in that
household has the same standard of living (i.e., attains the same indifference curve
over goods) that he would attain if he were to live alone with total expenditures
ym∗(p, y). This could be applied to the calculation of poverty lines for different
households. Similarly, in the case of a wrongful death or insurance calculation, a
woman (or a mother and her children, if V f is defined as the joint utility function
of a mother and her children) would need income y f ∗(p, y) to attain the same
standard of living without her husband that she (or they) attained while in the
household with the husband present and total expenditures y. This would be suf-
ficient to compensate for the loss of economies of scale and scope from shared
consumption (and for any changes in preferences over goods that result from liv-
ing in the household), but would not account for grieving, loss of companionship,
or other components of utility that are assumed to be separable from consumption
of goods. It would also not account for any change in preferences over goods that
might occur as a result of the death.
Another interesting equivalence scale to construct might be y f ∗/ym∗, the ratio
of how much income a woman needs when living alone to the income a man
needs when living alone to make each as well off as they would be in a household.
Interestingly, even if men and women had identical preferences, this ratio need
not equal one in general, because for example if the sharing rule η is bigger than
one half, then the wife receives more than half of the household’s resources, and
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hence would need more income when living alone to attain the same standard of
living.
To separate bargaining effects from other considerations, other measures of
collective based equivalent income could be calculated. For example, the ratio
y f ∗/ym∗ might better match the intuition of an equivalence scale if each yi∗ equa-
tion were calculated as the solution to
V i
t
p
yi∗(p, y)
u
= V i
tπ(p/y)
1/2
u
(6)
which gives equivalent incomes assuming equal sharing of resources.
In other applications, one might want to consider the roles of equivalent in-
come and sharing rule jointly. For example, given poverty lines for singles, one
might define the corresponding poverty line for the couple as the minimum y such
that, by choosing η optimally, each member i of the couple would have an equiv-
alent income yi∗ equal to his or her poverty line as a single.
4 Identification
In our context, the demand functions of singles and the aggregate demands of
household are observable. The identification question is thus, given the observ-
able demand functions hm, h f , and h, can the consumption technology func-
tion F and the private good equivalent demand functions x f (p/y) and xm(p/y)
be estimated? We show that these functions are ’generically’ nonparametrically
identified, meaning that identification will only fail if the utility and technology
functions are too simple (for example, a linear F is not identified if demands are
of the linear expenditure system form). This identification in turn implies identi-
fication of all of the above described features of the model, including the sharing
rule, economies of scale, and adult equivalence scales.
A question closely related to identification is, given functional forms for the
technology, the sharing rule, and the demands of singles, what is the implied func-
tional form for household demands? This also is generically identified, and in the
case of linear consumption technologies has the simple, explicit solution given in
Proposition 2.
16
4.1 Identification of the consumption technology and sharing
rule
We first investigate whether, given the observable Marshallian demand functions
of singles and households, and a linear consumption technology, one can in gen-
eral uniquely recover the private good equivalent functions xm and x f , the con-
sumption technology F, and the sharing rule η. In general, the answer is positive,
provided that the number of goods is n ≥ 3.
To see why, take some given (finite) set of price vectors p1, ..., pT where
T ≥ n+ 10. These may be interpreted as prices in different time periods. For any
pt and any y, let zt denote the corresponding household demand; from Proposition
2, we know that
zt = Ah f
t
A) pt
y − a) pt
1
η(pt/y)
u
+Ahm
t
A) pt
y − a) pt
1
1− η(pt/y)
u
+a, t = 1, ..., T
(7)
This provides, for each t , (n − 1) independent equations, hence a total of (n − 1) T
equations. The unknowns, on the other hand, are the matrix A, the vector a and
the scalars ηt = η(pt/y), t = 1, ..., T ; hence a total of n2 + n + T unknowns.
If n ≥ 3, then with T ≥ n + 10, the number of equations exceeds the number
of unknowns, so the system is generically identified. This allows us to recover
the consumption technology. Finally, once A and a are known, the sharing rule
η (p/y) is identified for all p/y from equation (4).
The private good equivalent functions xm and x f follow, since
x f (p/y) = h f
t
A) p
y − a) p
1
η(p/y)
u
and
xm (p/y) = h f
t
A) p
y − a) p
1
1− η(p/y)
u
This result is only generic since the equations (7) may fail to be linearly in-
dependent for particular functional forms. For example, it can be readily verified
that identification fails when the individual demands h f and hm have the Lin-
ear Expenditure System functional form. However, such problems disappear for
sufficiently complicated functional forms for members demands. This claim is
illustrated in the next subsection for the Almost Ideal (AIDS) and Quadratic Al-
most Ideal (QUAIDS) functional forms. The latter will be used for our empirical
estimation. A notable implication of these results is that our collective based
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equivalence scales are completely identified from observable demand data, with-
out any assumptions regarding cardinalizations or interpersonal comparability of
utility functions.
In the appendix we show that, with some minimal assumptions, generic non-
parametric identification holds not just for linear consumption technologies z =
Ax+a, but also for arbitrary technologies, that is, z = F(x) for general monotonic
vector valued functions F . This shows that our general methodology does not de-
pend on functional form assumptions to obtain identification.
4.2 The case of QUAIDS individual demands
For our empirical application, we use a parametric approach. Instead of specifying
the structural model as in program (P∗), the following convenient method is used
to construct functional forms for estimation. First, choose ordinary indirect utility
functions for members m and f , and let hm and h f be the corresponding ordinary
Marshallian demand functions. Assume a linear consumption technology F . Next
choose a functional form for the sharing rule η, which could simply be a constant,
or a function of measures of bargaining power such as relative wages of the house-
hold members or other distribution parameters. This sharing rule function must
lie between zero and one. Proposition 2 then provides the resulting functional
form for the household demand function h(p/y), and ensures that a correspond-
ing household program exists that rationalizes the choice of functions hm , h f , and
η.
In our empirical application we assume singles have preferences given by the
Integrable QUAIDS demand system of Banks, Blundell and Lewbel (1997). For
i = f or m, let wi = ωi(p/yi ) denote the n-vector of member i’s budget shares
wik (k = 1, ..., n) when living as a single, facing prices p and having total ex-
penditure level yi . The QUAIDS demand system we estimate takes the vector
form
ωi(p/yi ) = αi +i ln p+β i
d
ln
b
yi
c
− ci (p)
e
+
λi
bi (p)
d
ln
b
yi
c
− ci (p)
e2 (8)
where ci(p) and bi (p) are price indices defined as
ci (p) = δi + (ln p))αi + 1
2
(ln p))i ln p (9)
ln[bi (p)] = (ln p))βi . (10)
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Here αi , βi and λi are n-vectors of parameters, i is an n×n matrix of parameters
and δi is a scalar parameter which we take to equal zero, based on the insensitivity
reported in Banks, Blundell, and Lewbel (1997). Adding up implies that e)αi = 1
and e)βi = e)λi = i e = 0 where e is an n-vector of ones. Homogeneity implies
that i )e = 0 and Slutsky symmetry is equivalent to i being symmetric. The
above restrictions yield the integrable QUAIDS demand system, which has the
indirect utility function
V i
t
p
yi
u
=



ln
b
yi
c
− ci (p)
bi (p)
−1
+ λi ) ln (p)


−1
(11)
for i = f and i = m. The singles demand functions ωi (p/yi) in equation (8) are
obtained by applying Roy’s identity to equation (11). Deaton and Muellbauer’s
(1980) Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) is the special case of the integrable
QUAIDS in which λi = 0.
Proposition 4 Assume singles have preferences given by the integrable QUAIDS,
and that couples have a linear household technology. Assume β f /= βm and
each element of β f , βm, and the diagonal of A is nonzero. Then the household
technology and the sharing rule are identified.
Proposition 4 confirms that the QUAIDS model for single’s preferences, with
a linear household technology, is sufficiently nonlinear to permit identification of
all the components of the couple’s model, as discussed in the previous subsection.
The assumption regarding nonzero and unequal elements in Proposition 4 can be
relaxed; see the proof in the Appendix for details.
5 Additional Results
5.1 Barten and Gorman Scales
Gorman’s (1976) general linear technology model assumes that household de-
mands are given by
z = Ahm
t
A) p
y − a) p
u
+ a (12)
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Barten (1964) scaling (also known as demographic scaling) is the special case of
Gorman’s model in which a = 0 and A is a diagonal matrix; see also Muellbauer
(1977). Demographic translation is Gorman’s linear technology with A equal to
the identity matrix and a non zero, and what Pollak andWales (1992) call the Gor-
man and reverse Gorman forms have both A diagonal and a nonzero. These are
all standard models for incorporating demographic variation (such as the differ-
ence between couples and individuals) into demand systems. The motivation for
these models is identical to the motivation for our linear technology F , but they
fail to account for the structure of the household’s program. Even if the household
members have identical preferences (h f = hm) and identical private equivalent
incomes (η = 1/2), comparison of equations (4) and (12) shows that household
demand functions will still not actually be given by the Gorman or Barten model.
In fact, comparison of these models shows that household demands will take the
form of Gorman’s linear technology, or some special case of Gorman such as
Barten, only if either one household member consumes all the goods (η is zero or
one), or if demands are linear in prices (i.e., the linear expenditure system).
5.2 Technology, Externalities, and Preference Changes
A maintained assumption of our model is that commodities (after transformation
by the consumption technology function) are privately consumed, and that pref-
erences do not change through marriage. What if these assumptions do not hold?
We will now show that our framework is compatible with more general assump-
tions, including externalities, public goods and preference changes. The price to
pay for these generalizations is that identification will require either richer data
sets or strong assumptions regarding preference changes, externalities, or public
goods. We also consider here what effects violations of our maintained assump-
tions would have on our estimates.
Public goods and externalities We first show how our framework could be ex-
tended to allow for the existence of pure public goods within the household (our
model already allows some degree of publicness via sharing and economies of
scale). For simplicity, assume for now that there is only one public and one pri-
vate good, denoted by X and x respectively, and that the household technology
is separable across goods. Pareto efficiency implies that the vector
b
x f , xm, X
c
solves the program (with obvious notations):
max
x f ,xm,z,Z
HU [U f (x f , X),Um(xm, X), p/y, P/y]
20
z = f
b
x f + xm
c
, Z = F(X), pz + PZ = y
An equivalent formulation is
max
x f ,xm,z
HU [U f (x f , X f ),Um(xm, Xm), p/y, P/y] (P∗∗)
z = f
b
x f + xm
c
, Z = F
b
max
b
X f , Xm
cc
, pz + PZ = y
Here, Xi can be interpreted as the quantity of the public good ’desired’ by member
i . In principle, we allow X f and Xm to differ, though the solution to this program
always entails X f = Xm .12 Program (P∗∗) is formally equivalent to program (P∗)
in section 2, except that F is now a function of the pair of individual consump-
tions, not of their sum only. In this model the demands of member f depend on
the vector
b
π/η, π i/η
c
, and similarly for member m. Each member i’s (Lindahl)
decentralizing price π i for the public good has π i > 0 and, if f (x) = Ax+a and
F(X) = BX + b, then
π = Ap
y − ap − bP
, π f + πm = BP
y − ap − bP
so the sum of individual prices for the public good plays the same role as the
price of a private commodity. A similar analysis could be used to incorporate
externalities within the household, whether positive or negative. Note, however,
that with negative externalities individual prices π i for the externality could be
negative.
A more general program that encompasses both (P∗∗) and our program (P∗) as
special cases is
max
x f ,xm,z
HU [U f (x f ),Um(xm), p/y] (Pˆ)
z = F(x f , xm), p)z = y
which allows for completely general consumption technology functions F(x f , xm).
Like the other programs, the general household model (Pˆ) can be decentralized,
but now the complete vector of Lindahl shadow prices will be different for mem-
bers m and f , being functions of the separate derivatives of F (assuming these
derivatives exist) with respect to xm and x f . In contrast, our program (P∗) as-
sumption of an additive technology z = F(x f + xm) makes the derivatives of F
12A strict inequality - say, X f < Xm - is ruled out because the constraints would then imply
that the opportunity cost of
b
Xm − X f
c
additional units consumed by f would be zero.
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with respect to xm and x f equal, resulting in shadow prices π(p/y) that are the
same for m and f . The problem with nonadditive technology models is that our
nonparametric identification result does not hold for them. In particular, it may
be the case that several different technology functions F(x f , xm) could generate
the same reduced-form demand functions. Identification would then need to rely
either on detailed functional form assumptions or on the availability of additional
information, such as each member’s individual consumptions xik for one or more
goods k.
Misspecifications due to public goods and externalities Without additional
information such as richer data, if our maintained assumptions are violated then
our estimates of the consumption technology function F may end up incorporat-
ing features like preference changes and externalities, in addition to purely tech-
nological economies of scale and scope in consumption. This means that some
calculations, in particular economies of scale and adult equivalence scales, will
need to be interpreted with caution. For example, a change in taste for dancing as
a result of marriage could show up as economies or diseconomies of scale in the
consumption of dancing shoes. We now consider some examples.
Suppose first that our model, which assumes an additive consumption tech-
nology Z = F
b
x f + xm
c
, were applied to data derived from a more general
technology Z = F
b
x f , xm
c
. How would this misspecification bias the results?
Our additive technology implies that both individuals face the same shadow prices
π . This will provide a good approximation to a more general technology if agents
have similar marginal valuations for the goods, and hence similar shadow prices.
In the particular example of a public good, our additive model will provide a
good approximation to actual behavior if the household members have a similar
willingness to pay for the public good. As shown above, the ’intrahousehold
price’ of a public good is twice the individual price that would be estimated in
our additive model. For example, in the absence of economies of scale or scope
for this commodity, the shadow price should be one half the market price, leading
in the Barten technology πk = Ak pk/y to a coefficient of Ak = 1/2. If, in
addition, economies of scale are present, the coefficient may become smaller than
one half; conversely, congestion (or partly private use) would typically generate
Barten coefficients between .5 and 1.
The analysis of positive externalities is similar to that of public goods. When
externalities are negative, it points to the opposite direction. Suppose, e.g., that
a commodity consumed by one member has a negative impact on the other per-
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son. Since the second person’s marginal willingness to pay is negative, the first
person’s individual price must exceed the household price. Now in the absence of
economies of scale or scope for this commodity, the estimated shadow price would
be larger than the market price, leading to a Barten coefficient greater than one.
More generally, if a commodity (say, tobacco) is consumed by both members and
each individual’s consumption has a negative impact on the other person’s welfare,
then each individual price may exceed the household price (because at the opti-
mum each member will have a positive marginal willingness to pay to get rid of
the other person’s consumption). Overall, in the absence of preference changes, an
estimated Barten coefficient larger than one would be suggestive of the presence
of negative consumption externalities for the commodity under consideration.
Changes in preferences A similar situation arises when marriage induces pref-
erence changes. Externalities versus changes in preferences would be hard if not
impossible to distinguish empirically. For example, if we found that households
consume proportionally more restaurant meals than either single males or single
females, this could be due either to externalities (each member’s marginal utility
of restaurant dining might be enhanced by the presence of their spouse) or by a
simple change in preferences (members liking restaurant food better when mar-
ried). The two explanations have different implications, e.g., under the externality
story only dinners taken with one’s spouse are increased in value, in contrast to
the preference change explanation. In practice, available data would hardly allow
the estimation of such subtle distinctions.
One way to address the issue of preference change is to explicitly incorporate
parameters to measure taste changes resulting from marriage in the model, in
addition to the household technology parameters. For example the mapping from
market prices to shadow prices could be given by:
πk = Lk Ak pk/y (13)
where Ak is a technological economies of scale parameter with value one for a
purely private good, and the parameter Lk captures common taste changes over
the ‘private good equivalent’ xk = (zk/Ak). If Lk = 1 then tastes for good k do
not change with marriage. If Lk < 1 then married individuals like good k more
than when they are single.
In this example, the household consumption technology is of the Barten type
z = Ax where A is diagonal, and the utility function of an individual i living alone
is, as before,Ui(zi), but now the individual’s tastes also change in a purely Barten
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way, fromUi (zi) before marriage toUi(Lzi) after marriage, where L is diagonal.
More formally, we should say that member i’s indifference curves are defined
by Ui(zi) before marriage and by Ui(Lzi) after. The member’s actual level of
utility presumably also changed after marriage, so Ui(Lzi) also undergoes some
unobservable monotonic transformation after marriage. This transformation is
absorbed into HU .
The household’s optimization function is then
max
x f ,xm,z
HU [U f (Lx f ),Um(Lxm), p/y]
z = A(x f + xm)
p)z = y
and the resulting household demands are exactly as before, except that everywhere
we had Ak we will now have Lk Ak .
If we could separately identify L and A (this identification issue is discussed
below), then we may define equivalence scales yi∗/y as in equation (5) using
either the preferences of member i as a single or the preferences of member i as a
member of a couple, that is, we could define yi∗ either as the solution to
V i
t
p
yi∗
u
= V i
t
A) p
ηi y
u
(14)
or as the solution to
V i
t
L ) p
yi∗
u
= V i
t
A)L ) p
ηi y
u
(15)
In general these two definitions will differ. An equivalence scale based on equa-
tion (14) makes member i as well off alone as she was in the couple, based in
both situations on the preferences (and hence indifference curves) she has a sin-
gle, while the equation (15) definition makes her as well off based on her personal
indifference curves as a household member. A third possible calculation, which
would not require separately identifying L and A, would be the solution to
V i
t
p
yi∗
u
= V i
t
A)L ) p
ηi y
u
(16)
which attempts to compensate member i for both taste change and economies of
scale, however, this definition entails the same untestable interpersonal compara-
bility or choice of cardinalization assumptions that afflict traditional equivalence
scale calculations, since in this case actually equating utilities would require re-
placing V i on the right of equation (16) with the unobservable monotonic trans-
formation discussed above.
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Identification Our general identification results do not hold when preferences
may change. This fact is easy to see from the equations above. The model incor-
porating preferences changes is observationally equivalent to our original model
with technology z = LA(x f + xm). In estimation, without additional information
we cannot separately identify the Ak’s and the Lk’s but only their product.
In our model it would be reasonable to interpret a Barten technology coeffi-
cient for good k of less than 0.5 or greater than 1 as partially reflecting externalities
or taste changes, e.g., as an estimate of Lk Ak for some taste change Lk . If we are
prepared to assert a priori that the good k (e.g., clothing) is purely private and
does not entail externalities, then we would be assuming Ak = 1 and the estimate
would serve to identify the change in taste Lk for that good. Identifying informa-
tion could instead come from direct measurement of sharing within the household,
e.g., Ak for auto use might be measured from direct observation of the percentage
of time that couples use their car jointly.
Rather than attempt to separately identify taste changes, it may be reasonable
to assume that, at least for some goods, the dollar effect of a change in tastes is
small. In equivalence scales this could mean using equation (16) as an approx-
imation to equation (15), because only the product Lk Ak is identified and Lk is
assumed to be relatively close to one. For example, joint consumption of heating
is likely to have a much larger effect on measured cost savings of living together
than on any change in tastes for heat. The portion of F that corresponds to taste
changes versus consumption technology is also largely irrelevant for calculations
such as demand elasticities, or the interpretation of the sharing rule η as a measure
of bargaining power.
Many applications of equivalence scales deal with appropriate compensation
for a change in status, for example, calculation of the appropriate level of life
insurance on a spouse, or compensation in legal cases of wrongful death. In these
circumstances, we would like to compensate for both changes in tastes and the loss
of purely technological economies of scale in consumption, and there would be
no need to separately identify each. This would still exclude noneconomic effects
such as grief and loss of companionship. Note, however, that this means using
equation (16), and any attempt like this to calculate compensation for changes in
taste rather than technology raises the traditional equivalence scale identification
issues.
Future work may lead to additional data or alternative assumptions that allow
for more complete separation of taste changes, externalities, and purely techno-
logical economies from sharing. While our particular identifying assumptions are
open to debate and (we hope) improvement, we believe that the model we provide
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here is an appropriate framework for analyzing these issues.
6 Empirical Application
An implication of our propositions is that one may directly specify a functional
form for η instead of for HU , which greatly simplifies empirical implementation of
the model. In our empirical implementation the sharing rule η is directly parame-
terized and estimated as part of the household’s demand functions. The simplest
specification simply lets η equal a constant to be estimated. More generally, η is
specified as a function of variables that affect bargaining power, such as the rela-
tive incomes and other demographic characteristics of the household members.
Given estimates of ordinary demand functions h f and hm from singles data,
equation (4) may then be estimated from household demand data, where the para-
meters to be estimated are the technology parameters A and a, and any parameters
in the sharing rule η(p/y). To maximize efficiency, we estimate these technology
and sharing rule parameters for couples simultaneously with the ordinary demand
function parameters in h f and hm for singles.
6.1 Data
We use Canadian FAMEX data from 1974, 1978, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1990 and
1992. The Canadian FAMEX is a multi-staged stratified clustered survey that
collects information on annual expenditures, incomes, labour supply and demo-
graphics for individual (‘economic’) households. The survey is not nationally
representative. In particular, in most years only information from respondents liv-
ing in large cities is collected (hence the high proportion of city dwellers in our
samples below). The survey is run in the Spring after the survey year (that is, the
information for 1978 was collected in Spring 1979). All of the information is col-
lected by interview so that the expenditure and income data are subject to recall
bias. Although this may give rise to problems, the FAMEX surveying method has
the great advantage that information on annual expenditures is collected. Thus
the FAMEX has much less problem with infrequency bias than do surveys based
on short diaries. It is also the case that since the survey year coincides with the
tax year (January to December) the income information is thought to be unusu-
ally reliable since it is collected at about the time that Canadians are filing their
(individual) tax returns. These are often explicitly referenced by the enumerators.
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Prices are taken from Statistics Canada. When composite commodities are
created, the new composite commodity price is the weighted geometric mean of
the component prices (a Stone price index) with budget shares averaged across the
strata (couples, single males and single females) for weights. Thus, the weights
are not the individual household budget shares.
We have three strata: single females, single males and couples with no one
else present in the household. We sample only younger agents: the single fe-
males and wives in couples are aged less than or equal to 42; single males and
husbands are all aged less than or equal to 45. All agents are in full year full time
employment and we have excluded any household with non–negative net income
or non-negative individual gross incomes. About 5% of couples in the original
sample drawn did not own cars; car ownership has a major impact on demand
patterns and modelling this 5% turned out to present problems. Consequently we
also select on couples having a car. The (non-durable) goods we model are: food
at home, restaurant expenditures, clothing, vices (alcohol and tobacco), transport,
services and recreation.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for our three strata. As can be seen, in-
come and total expenditure is lowest for single females and highest for couples.
Total expenditure on nondurables is between 41% and 45% of net income. Home
ownership is significantly higher for couples than for singles. Single males have
significantly higher budget shares for restaurant, vices and transport than single
females. Single females have higher budget shares for food at home, clothing and
services. Of course, this does not necessarily mean that single men and women
have different preferences since these are conditional on demographics and real
total expenditure which differ across the two strata. Below we shall present tests
for whether single men and women have the same preferences. Finally the budget
shares of couples are much closer to those of single females than to those of single
men for all goods except for transport and services.
6.2 Singles Budget Shares
Our model starts with a utility derived functional form for the budget shares of
singles. For this we use the QUAIDS model described in equations (8), (9), (10),
and (11), with i = m for single men and f for single women. We also estimate
a QUAIDS for couples to provide an initial comparison with singles and with our
collective household model.
We allow the α and β parameters in the QUAIDS to depend on demographics.
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Single Single Couples
females males Husband Wife
Sample size 1393 1574 1610
Net income* 26, 137 30, 890 56, 578
Total expenditure* 11, 855 13, 645 23, 175
Wife’s share of gross income - - 0.43
bs(food at home) 0.18 0.16 0.18
bs(restaurant) 0.11 0.15 0.11
bs(clothing) 0.16 0.09 0.14
bs(vices) 0.07 0.12 0.08
bs(transport) 0.21 0.25 0.25
bs(services) 0.17 0.10 0.12
bs(recreation) 0.11 0.13 0.11
car 0.64 0.78 1
home owner 0.13 0.23 0.58
city dweller 0.85 0.81 0.83
age 29.9 31.1 30.2 28.2
higher education 0.20 0.25 0.21 0.19
Francophone 0.19 0.17 0.21 0.18
Allophone 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07
White collar 0.43 0.40 0.39 0.37
Notes. * mean for 1992 (when prices are unity).
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
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Specifically we take:
αik = αik0 +
Mα;
m=1
αikmdm (17)
βik = βik0 +
Mβ;
m=1
βikmdm (18)
where Mβ = 2 for singles (dummies for owning a car and being a home owner)
and Mβ = 1 for couples (a home owner dummy).13 For the intercept demo-
graphics we have Mα = 18 for couples and Mα = 13 for singles. These demo-
graphics include some variables that are common to everyone in the household:
four regional dummies; a house ownership dummy and a dummy for living in a
city. For singles we also have a car ownership dummy. As well we include in-
dividual specific demographics: age and age squared, a dummy for having more
than high school education, dummies for being French speaking or neither Eng-
lish nor French speaking and an occupation dummy for being in a white collar
job. Although these demographics are highly correlated within couples we need
to include both sets so that we can allow for the dependence of couples’ budget
shares on both sets of individual characteristics. We have 24 and 28 parameters
per good/equation for singles and couples respectively.
Before presenting estimates for our model, we graph the QUAIDS fits for the
different goods for the three strata (with homogeneity and symmetry imposed).
We estimate by GMM and take account of the endogeneity of total expenditure by
using as instruments for singles: all of the demographics and log relative prices
(the included variables) plus log real net income14 and its square, the product
of real net income with the car and home ownership dummies and absolute log
prices. For instruments for couples we use the instruments used for singles (with-
out, of course, the car dummy variables), with individual specific values for hus-
bands and wives, where appropriate. We also include logs of the individual gross
incomes and the ratio of the wife’s gross income to total gross income (we discuss
these variables below). In all we have 25 instruments per equation for singles and
32 instruments per equation for couples. Without symmetry there is one degree
of over-identification for each equation for singles and four per equation for cou-
ples. For singles, the χ2 (6) statistics for the over-identifying restrictions are 5.8
13Recall that we have selected only couples who own a car.
14This is the log of nominal net income divided by a Stone price index computed for our seven
non-durables goods.
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(probability = 44%) and 12.4 (5.4%) for single females and single males respec-
tively. For couples, the over-identifying χ2 (24) statistic is 40.6 (1.8%). We then
impose symmetry on both sets of estimates; the respective χ2 (15) statistics for
single females, single males and couples are 25.3 (4.6%), 28.0 (2.1%) and 28.6
(1.8%).15
Much of our analysis is based on single men and women having different
preferences, so we present tests for the sets of parameters being the same. For the
six equations modelled we have the following χ2 (24) statistics for equality: 52
(food), 118 (restaurant), 686 (clothing), 95 (recreation), 117 (transport) and 622
(services). Thus we decisively reject that single men and single women have the
same preferences.
To show the differences between predicted demands for singles and couples,
we calculate predictions for agents who live in Ontario in 1992, the year and re-
gion for which prices are set to unity. For the other demographics we take the
means for Ontario in 1992. For total expenditure we take a range from the first
decile to the ninth decile. Figures 1 to 7 present the plots for our seven goods. In
the figures we shift the plots for couples to the left to make them more ‘readable’;
the shift chosen is purely for display purposes.16 The relative positions for sin-
gle men and single women are similar to the unconditional budget shares given
above for all goods except for food at home for which single men have a higher
predicted budget share for a given level of total expenditure.17 We find that food
at home is a necessity for all strata and that transport and services are necessities
for singles. Restaurants and recreation are luxuries for all strata and vices are a
luxury for singles. Clothing is a necessity for low income single women but a
luxury for high income single women (the QUAIDS quadratic term is significant).
The other important feature of these graphs is that vices are a necessity and trans-
port is a luxury for low income couples. One objective of this paper is to see how
well we can reconcile these predictions with a model in which we have common
preferences for each sex (whether they be married or single) and a parsimonious
set of sharing rule and technology parameters.
15Note that this QUAIDS model for couples, which we only estimate for comparison, is a uni-
tary model, while our proposed model is a collective model, which in general need not satisfy
Slutsky symmetry.
16Since the leftward shift we have used to graph the budget shares for couples is arbitrary, we
cannot interpret the relative positions of the couples.
17The lower mean value for single men in Table 1 is because they have a higher mean value for
total expenditure and the food budget share is decreasing in the latter.
30
6.3 The Joint Model
For our empirical application, we assume singles demands have the integrable
QUAIDS functional form described in equations (8), (9), (10), (11), (17) and (18).
The joint model therefore includes one set of αi , β i , iand λi parameters (includ-
ing demographic components) for men, i = m, and another complete set of these
parameters for women, i = f . Let w fk = ω
f
k (p/y f ) and wmk = ωmk (p/ym) de-
note the QUAIDS budget share of consumption of good k for single women and
single men, respectively.
For couples we assume a Barten type technology function defined as
zk = Akxk (19)
for each good k, and so is equivalent to the general linear technology z = Ax + a
when the matrix A is diagonal and overheads a are zero. The shadow prices for
this technology are
πk =
Ak pk
y
(20)
where the couple faces prices p and has total expenditure level y. This technology
function is particularly convenient for budget share models. Letwk = ωk(p/y) be
the budget share of good k for the household, so ωk(p/y) = pkhk(p/y)/y. With
the technology function (19) and corresponding shadow prices (20), equation (4)
yields the following simple expression for the couple’s budget shares
ωk (p/y) = ηω fk
tπ
η
u
+ (1− η)ωmk
t π
1− η
u
(21)
Equation (21) shows that, with a Barten type technology, the budget shares of the
couple equal a weighted average of the budget shares of its members, with weights
given by the income sharing rule η and 1− η. Equation (21) clearly illustrates the
point discussed earlier that η represents both the fraction of equivalent resources
controlled by the wife (by appearing in her budget share demands) and the extent
to which the household’s demands resemble her demands (by appearing as the
weight on her shares).
The parameters of the couples model consist of all the QUAIDS parameters
of both the single’s models ω f and ωm , the Barten scales Ak which we model as
constants, and the parameters of the sharing rule η. Our model for η is
η =
exp
b
s)δ
c
1+ exp (s)δ) (22)
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where s is a household specific vector of distribution factors and δ is a vector
of parameters. This logistic form bounds the sharing rule between zero and one.
Based in part on the bargaining models of Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori and
Lechene (1994) and Browning and Chiappori (1998), the distribution factors that
comprise s are a constant, the wife’s share in total gross income, the difference in
age between husband and wife, a home-ownership dummy and log deflated (by a
Stone price index) household total expenditure.
The joint system consists of the vectors of budget shares for singlesω f (p/y f )
and ωm(p/ym) and the vector of budget shares for couples ω(p/y). For efficiency
these are all estimated simultaneously, since all the parameters in the singles mod-
els also appear in the couples model.
We estimate the joint system by GMM. We assume that the error terms are
uncorrelated across households but are correlated across goods within households.
Let ωh be the (n − 1) vector of budget shares for the first n − 1 goods consumed
by household h. Denote the vector of all parameter values by θ and let ωˆh (θ) be
the predicted budget shares for household h. The error vector for household h is
thus given by uh (θ) = ωh − ωˆh (θ). Let the numbers of couples, single females
and single males be given by Hc, Hf and Hm respectively. Denote the (1× gc)
vector of instruments for couples by zch and similarly for singles (where gc = 32
and g f = gm = 25). The vector of moment conditions for couples is given by the
((n − 1) gc × 1) vector:
µc (θ) =
Hc;
h=1
u)h
b
In−1 ⊗ zch
c
and similarly for singles. The overall weighting matrix is given by:
W =


Wc 0 0
0 W f 0
0 0 Wm


where:
Wc =

Hc;
h=1
b
In−1 ⊗ zch
c) u˜cu˜c)
b
In−1 ⊗ zch
c
−1
and similarly for the weighting matrices for singles. The residuals u˜c are taken
from a first stage GMM with an identity weighting matrix. For the singles these
first stage residuals are from the QUAIDS estimates reported earlier. For couples,
these first stage residuals are from estimates of the couples budget share system
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(21), estimated using just couples data.18. The GMM criterion is the sum of the
GMM criteria for the three strata with these weighting matrices, that is,
min
θ
j
µc (θ))Wccµc (θ)+ µ f (θ))W fµ f (θ)+ µm (θ))Wmµm (θ)
k
where θ is the full parameter vector. In our system we have at least 258 preference
parameters (6 ∗ 24 − 15 = 129 symmetry constrained QUAIDS parameters for
each of men and women, plus the sharing rule and Barten scale parameters). We
have 492 instruments (for each good there are 25 instruments for each single strata
and 32 for couples), giving a maximum degrees of freedom of 234 for the simplest
model. This is a very large system that takes a long time to converge for any given
specification. Consequently we are restricted in the inferences and diagnostics we
present. For such a non-linear system conventional measures of standard errors
can be quite misleading (see Gregory and Veall (1985)19) but extensive quasi-
likelihood testing of the ‘significance’ of particular parameters are prohibitively
time consuming.
6.4 Estimation
We start with an extremely parsimonious specification and add extra parameters
until we find a ‘satisfactory’ fit. We postpone detailed discussion of the implica-
tions of the models until we have a preferred specification.20 As a benchmark, we
first estimate with no technology and equal sharing (η = 0.5 and Ak = 1 for all
k). This corresponds to a model in which there are no economies of scale for any
18Without singles data, the parameters from the couples model are not all identified, but all
that is required for the first stage are unrestricted residual estimates. One could, alternatively, use
the residuals from the QUAIDS estimates for couples, but doing so would lead to asymptotically
inefficient parameter estimates in the second stage, because the joint model for couples is not a
special case of a QUAIDSmodel. We found that use of residuals from the couples QUAIDSmodel
estimates gave similar qualitative results but significantly higher values for the test statistics for
over-identification reported below.
19This is a problem that is endemic to large, highly nonlinear models, often resulting in sub-
stantial differences in the p-values of asymptotically equivalent Wald and likelihood ratio tests of
variable exclusion hypothesis.
20Estimation is made extremely difficult by the time it takes to estimate any variant (several
days) and the fact that there are multiple local minima for each variant. For example, for our
preferred specification we found over ten local minima, some of which give quite different im-
plications. As always in this case, we report results for the estimates that gave the lowest value
for the over-identifying restriction test statistic, but the possibility remains that these are not at a
global minimum.
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Model
1 2 3
Sharing rule 0.5 0.68 0.70∗
Barten scale, food 1 0.93 0.82
Barten scale, rest 1 0.78 0.79
Barten scale, cloth 1 1.70 1.88
Barten scale, vices 1 3.19 3.00
Barten scale, trans 1 0.55 0.51
Barten scale, serv 1 0.59 0.59
Barten scale, recr 1 1.31 1.38
df 234 226 222
χ2 432.0 236.1 224.1
P-value (%) 0 30.8 44.8
∗ at mean of sharing of factors
Table 2: Results
goods and a fixed equal sharing rule. The χ2 (234) statistic for the restrictions is
432 so that this model is, as we would expect, decisively rejected. The next model
we estimate (model 2) allows for a variable share parameter and seven variable
Barten terms, so we have extra parameters (η, A1, ...A7). The results are given in
the second column of Table 2. As can be seen, allowing for unequal sharing and
Barten scaling improves the fit dramatically: the χ2 (8) statistic for these parame-
ters all having the same value as the benchmark model is 195. 9. Moreover this
model gives a satisfactory value for the test of the over-identifying restrictions.
The next model, 3, replaces a constant sharing rule with the model of equation
(22) which includes the four household specific distribution factors described ear-
lier. In the third column of Table 2 we present the estimated values of η (at the
mean of the data) and the Ak’s. The χ2 (4) statistic for the inclusion of the demo-
graphics is 12. 0 so that the sharing factors are jointly significant. We shall take
this variant as our preferred specification.21
At our preferred estimates transport and services are estimated to be almost
wholly public (the Barten scale is close to one half). We also find economies of
21We also tried adding fixed costs a to the consumption technology. Although these improved
the fit somewhat they yielded extreme values for some of the equivalence scales considered later.
Given the time taken to estimate any variant of the model we decided not to explore further models
with fixed costs.
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scale for food at home and food in restaurants. According to our previous dis-
cussion, these findings may also reflect the public nature of these commodities
and/or the existence of positive externalities associated with their consumption.
Since these four goods account for a high share of total expenditure, we shall
expect to find fairly significant economies of scale. Recreation, clothing and par-
ticularly vices have Barten scales above unity. If assume these good are purely
private, then these scales could be interpreted as taste changes, specifically, that
married people ‘like’ these goods less than singles do. Alternative explanations
are possible, for instance, negative externalities could explain the large coefficient
obtained for vices. We return to this issue below.
6.5 Implications of parameter estimates
6.5.1 The fit of the model
We first discuss the fit of the preferred model 3. Our model imposes strong re-
strictions on the differences between budget shares of singles and couples, so we
might expect to see large differences between the QUAIDS fits and our model fits.
On the other hand, the over-identifying restrictions for our model are not rejected
which suggests that the restrictions may not be significant. In figure 2 we present
the Engel curve fits for our seven goods for the reference group used for figure 1.
Comparing the fits for singles with those of figure 1 (the unconstrained QUAIDS
fits) we see that the two sets of estimates are very similar. This is to be expected
given that both use a QUAIDS specification. For couples, the Engel curves for
‘eating out’, ‘clothing’, ‘services’ and ‘recreation’ are also close to the QUAIDS
fits. The ‘food at home’ Engel curve is somewhat different, but food is still found
to be a necessity, though the Engel curve for couples is now between that of single
females and single males. The Engel curves for ‘vices’ appears somewhat differ-
ent (‘vices’ are now estimated to be a luxury for couples and the budget shares are
very close to those for single women) but given the imprecision of the fit for this
good, the differences are probably not statistically significant. ‘Transport’, how-
ever, is very different; we now find that it is unequivocally a necessity for couples
and that the budget share is about half way between those of singles.
The QUAIDS for all strata and our model are not strictly nested, so we com-
pute an informal quasi-likelihood test statistic for comparing the two.22 To do this
we compare the over-identifying test statistic for the two sets of estimates, using
22Formal tests for comparing nonnested models are impratical, and not likely to be very reliable,
given the size and complexity of the models being compared.
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Household characteristics Wife’s share
Benchmark 0.65
First quartile total expenditure 0.60
Third quartile total expenditure 0.68
Renters 0.77
Wife’s income share = 0.25 0.65
Wife’s income share = 0.75 0.66
Husband ten years older 0.65
Wife ten years older 0.65
Table 3: Sharing rule implications
the same weighting matrix. The QUAIDS system (with symmetry imposed) has
411 parameters and our system has 270, so that we have 141 ‘restrictions’. If we
use the weighting matrix from the our system then the over-identifying statistic
for the QUAIDS system is 61.0 and for our system it is 224.1. The difference
of 163.1, which has a probability value of 9.4%, suggesting that our system, al-
though very restrictive, would not be rejected against the QUAIDS system. On
the other hand, if we use the weighting matrix from the QUAIDS system then the
over-identifying statistics for the QUAIDS system is 91.0 and for our system it is
475.2. This gives a difference of 414.2 which suggests that the QUAIDS system,
with its 141 additional parameters, fits a good deal better.
6.5.2 The sharing rule
We now present some of the substantive implications of our estimates. We begin
with the sharing rule. When considering the values presented here it is most im-
portant to keep in mind that, as discussed earlier, the sharing rule η encompasses
both the wife’s share of private consumption and the influence or power the wife
has on the household’s demand for public or joint consumption.
Table 3 gives the values of the sharing rule for different sets of characteristics.
The benchmark household has a home-owning husband and wife with the same
gross income and age and with median total expenditure for Ontario in 1992.23
Table 3 presents the estimates of the level and variations in the sharing rule. At
our benchmark value the wife’s share is 0.65. As we discussed, if this was purely
23In the estimation results presented above the values of the sharing parameter given (0.70) was
at the mean of data for the whole sample.
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for private goods then this would be implausibly high but it also reflects the effects
of joint or public consumption. More generally, this number says that household
demand functions look more like women’s demand functions than men’s demand
functions.
From rows 2 and 3 we see that the wife’s share is strongly increasing in total
expenditure so that in poorer households the wife’s share is much lower. This
impact of total expenditures on the sharing rule means that household’s demands
are not unitary, that is, they are not equal to demands that would arise from the
maximization of a single, ordinary utility function.
Other rows of this table show that the home-ownership status variable has a
very strong impact with renting households apparently having a much higher share
for the wife. As we saw above, the pattern of home ownership between singles
and couples is very different so this result is probably due at least in part to a se-
lection effect rather than a genuine difference in intra-household allocations. We
leave the important (but difficult) task of accounting adequately for selection ef-
fects to future work. Neither the wife’s share of income nor their relative ages has
much impact on the sharing rule. This is very different from the results reported in
Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori and Lechene (1994), which examines conven-
tional sharing rules for private goods using similar data on couples. Note that the
latter paper did not include the home ownership dummy in the sharing rule and
included real household income instead of total expenditures. Nonetheless the
qualitative differences are striking and suggest that allowing for household tech-
nology may have a major impact on our conclusions regarding intra-household
allocations.
6.5.3 Economies of scale
We now consider estimates of the private good equivalent consumption for mar-
ried men and married women and the resulting economies of scale. Given esti-
mates of the budget share systems for singles,wik = ωik(p/yi), and for households
(equation 21), the private good equivalent quantities for each household member
are given by
x fk =
η
πk
ω fk
tπ
η
u
(23)
xmk =
1− η
πk
ωmk
t π
1− η
u
, (24)
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the economies of scale to consumption are
p)z
p)x
=
y
p)(x fk + x
f
k )
, (25)
In Table 4 we present results for four different cases. First we present results
with the sharing rule in the household fixed at one half (but with the same para-
meter estimates for the Barten scales as for the estimated value of the sharing rule
parameters) and then for the mean estimated benchmark value of 0.65 (models A
and B and models C and D respectively). The other variation is in the value of
the Barten scales. If these reflected only publicness of goods then they would be
bounded between one half (purely public) and unity (purely private). In practice,
as discussed in section 5 these values may also capture consumption externalities
within the household and preference changes consequent on being married, and
so may lie outside these bounds. For example, if ‘clothing’ is purely private but
the members of a couple ‘like’ clothing less than when they were single, then we
would estimate a Barten scale of greater than unity. This would lead to smaller ap-
parent economies of scale. To partly purge the estimates of these effects, we also
present results with the Barten scales capped at unity (models B and D). Referring
to Table 2 above, we see that the goods which are capped are clothing, vices and
recreation; our setting of the Barten scales to unity for these goods is equivalent to
assuming that the three goods are purely private and that the estimates of greater
than unity reflect preference changes.
In Table 4 the first set of estimates (labelled “Ebs, good”) give the equivalent
budget shares for different goods for each member. At unit market prices these
are defined as:
ω˜ fi =
π i h fi (π/η)
η =
Aih fi (A1/η, ...An/η)
η
ω˜mi =
π i hmi (π/ (1− η))
(1− η) =
Aih fi (A1/ (1− η) , ...An/ (1− η))
(1− η) (26)
In practice, we use the QUAIDS estimates for men and women directly to calcu-
late the individual budget shares, with Barten scales and shares replacing market
prices and total expenditure. These estimates allow us to look at the ’tastes’ of
married men and women, allowing for economies of scale, sharing and preference
changes. The second set of estimates (labelled “Ratio, good”) give the ratios of
equivalent consumptions:
ratio for good i = h fi (A1/η, ...An/η)/h
f
i (A1/ (1− η) , ...An/ (1− η)) (27)
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These estimates present a picture of the relative contributions to the ‘purchase’ of
equivalent consumption by each person.
The first column of Table 4 presents results with equal sharing and unmodi-
fied Barten scales. Thus men and women face the same shadow prices and have
the same total expenditure. Women have higher budget shares for food at home,
clothing and household services and lower budget shares for eating out and vices.
Since we impose equal sharing these differences in budget shares translate directly
into the ratios for equivalent consumption given in the lower half of the table. For
example, wives purchase more than twice as much of the ‘services equivalent’ as
do their husbands but less than one half of the ‘vices equivalent’.
One of the most important implications of the estimates is the scale economy
parameter (for the benchmark values), see equation (25). This is estimated to be
0.79. That is, two singles would need 27% (= 100 ∗ (1/0.79 − 1)) more total
expenditures than a couple if they are to consume the same equivalent private con-
sumptions. Once again we warn that this value likely reflects both pure household
technology economies of scale and externalities or taste changes, and so should
be treated with caution.
The estimates for model A assume that all changes in demand patterns are due
to economies of scale in consumption. As discussed above, with this rationaliaa-
tion values of the Barten scale should be between one half and unity. In model
B we cap the values that are greater than unity to unity (but continue to maintain
equal sharing). This lowers the shadow price of clothing, vices and recreation with
respect to model A. Thus these changes induce both (compensated) price effects
and an income effect from agents facing significantly lower absolute prices for
three goods which have an aggregate budget share of about 30%. For women, the
budget shares for clothing and recreation rise and for men they fall. The budget
shares for vices does not change much. These own price responses reflect that the
demands for clothing and recreation are (uncompensated) price inelastic for men
but price elastic for women.24 There are also important (uncompensated) cross-
price effects. In particular, the budget shares for household services change quite
radically and the ratio of equivalent consumptions for services is much smaller.
As we would expect, the extent of scale economies is now greater (since couples
face lower shadow prices for some goods) and two singles would now require
41% more total expenditure to buy the same equivalent consumption levels.
In models A and B we imposed equal sharing. The next two models assume
24The budget shares increases with an own price increase if and only if the own price elasticity
is greater than minus unity.
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Model A B C D
Wife’s share 0.5 0.5 0.65 0.65
Ak ≤ 1,∀k No Yes No Yes
W M W M W M W M
Ebs, food 19.2 13.1 17.8 16.4 15.7 16.9 13.9 20.7
Ebs, rest 8.8 15.8 9.0 14.6 9.5 13.7 9.9 12.8
Ebs, cloth 9.4 8.7 13.1 6.8 12.5 10.8 16.3 7.1
Ebs, vices 5.8 13.9 5.6 13.3 6.5 12.1 6.3 11.8
Ebs, tran 25.7 27.3 23.9 26.3 23.6 28.0 22.0 27.6
Ebs, serv 17.2 8.1 14.9 11.6 17.5 8.4 15.2 12.1
Ebs, recr 13.8 13.1 15.7 11.0 14.7 10.1 16.4 7.8
Ratio, food 1.46 1.08 1.73 1.26
Ratio, rest 0.56 0.61 1.30 1.45
Ratio, cloth 1.08 1.91 2.15 4.26
Ratio, vices 0.42 0.42 1.01 1.00
Ratio, tran 0.94 0.91 1.57 1.49
Ratio, serv 2.13 1.28 3.87 2.34
Ratio, recr 1.06 1.42 2.72 3.93
Scale economy 0.79 0.71 0.79 0.72
Ebs = budget share (×100) of equivalent expenditures
Ratio = ratio of equivalent expenditures
Table 4: Implications of estimates
that the wife receives the benchmark value of 65% of household total expenditure
to buy goods at the shadow prices given by the Barten scales. Comparing the
predictions for models A and C we see that, as we would expect the women’s
budget shares rise for necessities and fall for luxuries (and conversely for men) but
the changes are relatively small. The ratios of expenditures are now all above unity
which simply reflects the fact that the wife now has an equivalent total expenditure
which is almost twice that of her husband’s. More importantly, the effects largely
cancel out in the estimate of the scale economy parameter and we have virtually
the same estimated value in both models. We conclude that the extent of sharing
within the household does not significantly affect the (technological) economies
of scale. The final model (D) in which we allow for unequal sharing and we cap
the Barten scales gives some differences in details but the same broad conclusions.
As well as providing estimates of the extent of economies of scale, these es-
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timates also provide an additional check on our identifying assumptions. In our
modelling we have not made a distinction between men and women’s clothing for
couples. If we assume that clothing is a private good and that wives only con-
sume women’s clothing and husbands only consume men’s clothing then we can
compare our estimate of the ratio of equivalent consumption of clothing with the
actual levels of men and women’s clothing. For the 1992 data we have a mean
ratio of 1.40.25 This is to be compared to the model C estimate of 2.15. The
latter value is largely due to the very high sharing parameter we have estimated.
As can be seen, if we have equal sharing then the ratio is 1.08. If we specify that
the ratio should be the same as for men and women’s clothing then we obtain a
sharing parameter of 0.55. This suggests that we could use the information on
men and women’s clothing and our auxiliary assumptions to achieve more precise
estimates. We shall return to this point later.
6.5.4 Welfare comparisons
The results presented in the last subsection relate to the technology and sharing
within the household. As we emphasised earlier, the finding (for models B and
D) that two singles require about 40%more total expenditure than a couple to buy
the same equivalent consumption levels represents an upper bound on the amount
needed to be as well off as they would be if living together. In practice, singles
buy different goods when living alone and can achieve the same level of utility as
when married at lower cost. In this subsection we present estimates of these adult
equivalence scales.
Let V i (p/yi) be the indirect utility function (up to any arbitrary monotonic
transformation) that gives rise to member i’s budget share demand functionswk =
ωk(p/yi). Then the minimum expenditure required by member i , while living
alone, to attain the same indifference curve over goods that he or she attains as a
member of the household is the number yi∗ that solves the equation
V f
t
p
y f ∗
u
= V f
tπ
η
u
(28)
25This estimate is based on estimated quadratic log equations for budget shares for men and
women’s clothing. We use the 1992 data and control for the same demographics as in our specifi-
cation. Given estimates of the budget shares at the mean of the data for Ontario in 1992, we take
ratios of the predictions.
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for i = f , and
Vm
t
p
ym∗
u
= Vm
t π
1− η
u
(29)
for i = m. We may then calculate the male adult equivalence scale for the house-
hold as y/ym∗ and for a female as y f ∗/ym∗. Alternatively, to separate issues of
bargaining power from other considerations, we may evaluate these equations and
the resulting equivalence scales substituting η = .5 into equations (28) and (29).
In Table 5 we present the adult equivalence scales and also the (technological)
scale economy parameter, for comparison purposes. If we impose equal sharing
and do not cap Barten scales then we estimate that single men and women need
about 57% of the total expenditure of a couple to be as well off. This is somewhat
below the scale economy estimate of 63.5% (half of 127% from above) for model
A. Thus the ability to chang expenditure patterns when single leads to a significant
decrease in the needs of singles. If we exclude the (presumed preference) changes
due to Barten scales being above unity, then the individual scales rise to about
68%, still assuming equal sharing.
If instead of equal sharing we take the benchmark share of 0.65, then we find
that men are better off when single even with less than half of household income.
This is the result of two effects: we estimate that married women receive more
private goods and they have more influence on the demand for shared goods.
If we take a more moderate share of 0.55 for the wife, as implied by the dis-
cussion at the end of the last subsection, then the estimates still differ radically
from the case of equal sharing. For the unmodified Barten scales single men now
need only half of the total expenditure of a couple to be as well off. These esti-
mates would suggest that there are no material gains to marriage for men (in terms
of gains from economies of scale in consumption of nondurables). women then
need 62% of a couple’s total expenditure to be as well off single as married. The
mean for men and women in models A and C are very similar, suggesting that the
‘aggregate’ scale is largely invariant to the sharing parameter. Finally, if we cap
the Barten scales then women and men need 74% and 63% respectively. As we
have emphasised above, there is no single ‘correct’ adult equivalence scale and
the value one would use depends on the context. Our estimates suggest the range
of possible equivalence scale values are quite wide, with values of between 58%
and 74% for women and between 50% and 68% for men.
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Model A B C D
Wife’s share 0.5 0.5 0.55 0.55
Ak ≤ 1,∀k No Yes No Yes
Scale economy 0.79 0.71 0.79 0.72
AE scale, women 57.9 67.7 62.5 73.9
AE scale, men 55.8 69.5 50.2 62.6
Table 5: Adult equivalence scales
7 Conclusions
Wemodel households in terms of the utility functions of its members, a bargaining
or social welfare function, and a consumption technology function. By employ-
ing a collective model and a separate consumption technology, we combine data
from singles and couples to identify equivalence scales, consumption economies
of scale, household members’ bargaining power and other related concepts, with-
out assumptions regarding cardinalizations or interpersonal comparability of pref-
erences. We also provide duality results that facilitate the empirical application of
the model. These include the use of an income sharing rule to model the outcome
of household bargaining or social welfare calculations, and shadow prices that em-
body economies of scale and scope arising from joint consumption. Our empirical
application of the model uses data from the Canadian FAMEX. We demonstrate
generic nonparametric identification of our model.
Given our framework, one useful area for further work would be the develop-
ment of alternative identifying assumptions. Without preference changes or exter-
nalities within the household, our model is very much over identified, in fact, in
our QUAIDS specification most of the parameters of the entire consumption tech-
nology can be identified from the couple’s demands for each good. This overi-
dentification might be exploited by relaxing the model in ways that incorporate
and identify possible externalities and changes in preferences between individu-
als in households and those living alone. Direct observation of some elements of
the equivalent consumption vectors x , x f , or xm would greatly aid identification,
by distinguishing components of F that are due to changes in preferences versus
pure economies of scale or scope in consumption. Such data might include direct
measures of the quantity of food wasted (discarded) by singles and couples, or
measures of the fraction of time couples drive together versus alone, or simply
treating mens and womens clothing as separate, private goods.
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Alternative identification conditions that minimize the data requirements on
singles would be valuable not only to relax assumptions regarding changes in
preferences, but also to extend the model to directly include the utility functions
of children, which for now must be assumed to be joint with the utility of an adult
household member.
Other useful directions for future research would be the development of em-
pirically tractable duality and identification results (akin to our Propositions 1 to
4) for more general, nonlinear consumption technology functions as discussed in
section 5.
While our particular identifying assumptions should be open to debate and
improvement, we believe that the model we have provided is an appropriate frame-
work for estimating and analyzing adult equivalence scales, consumption economies
of scale, household members’ bargaining power, and other concepts relating to
household preferences, consumption, and demand behavior.
Appendix
Here we provide proofs and some additional related results.
Proof of Proposition 1
Consider the household as a two person economy facing the technological con-
straint pF(x f + xm) = y. From the welfare theorems, any equilibrium is Pareto
efficient, and any Pareto efficient allocation can be decentralized as an equilibrium
for some lump-sum transfers. In particular, consider the Pareto efficient allocation
characterized by program (P∗), and let
b
xm, x f
c
be the corresponding individual
demands. The decentralization is that the household can satisfy its objective func-
tion, Program P∗, by telling each member i to choose a utility maximizing private
consumption vector xi (program Pi ), but subject to a budget constraint π )xi = ηi .
For some shadow price vector π = π(p/y) and shadow incomes ηi = ηi (p/y)
(having F depend on x f and xm only through their sum results in shadow prices
π being the same for both members). The second welfare theorem implies that
agent i , facing prices π and income ηi , will choose the bundle xi = hi (π/ηi), and
the household then actually purchases the vector z = F (x) where x = x f + xm .
By homogeneity, we may without loss of generality normalize the price vector
π such that the total shadow income π )x = 1, and define the sharing rule η(p/y)
by η = η f = π )x f , and ηm = 1 − η. The sharing rule η is the fraction of
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the household’s shadow income that is allocated to member f , and therefore is
a measure of her weight or bargaining power in the household’s program. She
then uses this income to ’buy’ her vector of private good equivalents x f , paying
shadow prices π . Similarly, member m allocates income 1 − η = ηm to obtain
private good equivalents xm , paying shadow prices π .
Proof of Proposition 2
If the technology is linear, so z = F(x) = Ax + a, then Program P∗ has
the constraint, (Ax + a)) p = y, which is equivalent to x )π = 1 with π(p/y) =
A) p/(y−a) p). One may then immediately verify that Program P∗ is equivalent to
the decentralization described in the proof of Proposition 1. using this expression
for π(p/y). Note that, in general, shadow prices π(p/y) will depend on both the
technology F and preferences and bargaining behavior of the household. How-
ever, in this household economy, when the technology is linear the ’production’
side alone determines the equilibrium shadow prices.
Proof of Proposition 3
A first order condition of the household’s program is
∂HU
∂Ui
∂Ui(xi)
∂xik
= λ0πk
for each member i and good k, where λ0 is a Lagrange multiplier. It follows that
∂HU
∂Ui
∂V i (π/ηi)
∂ηi =
∂HU
∂Ui
xi )DUi(xi )
ηi = λ0
so
∂HU/∂U f
∂HU/∂Um
=
∂V f (π/η f )/∂η f
∂Vm(π/ηm)/∂ηm
It can then be directly verified that all of the first order conditions from the pro-
gram P∗ are unchanged when HU is replaced with µ(p/y)U f (x f ) + Um(xm),
where
µ = ∂
HU/∂U f
∂HU/∂Um
= −
∂V f (π/η)/∂η
∂Vm(π/1− η)/∂η).
This establishes the relationship between µ(p/y) and η(p/y). Properties of this
relationship follows from standard properties of indirect utility functions with re-
spect to income.
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Proof of Proposition 4
The AIDS quantity demand for good j consumed by single i is
hij (p/yi) =
yi
p j
r
αij + ij ln p + βij
d
ln
b
yi
c
− ci (p)
es
where
ci (p) = (ln p))αi + 1
2
(ln p))i ln p
ln[bi (p)] = (ln p))β i
αi and βi are n-vectors of parameters, i is an n×n matrix of parameters, e)αi =
1, e)βi = i e = 0 where e is an n-vector of ones, and i is symmetric.
Linear technology implies that the shadow price for good j is
π j =
A· j p
y − a) p
=
3
k Akj pk
y − a) p
where A· j is the transpose of the j’th column of A and Akj is the k’th element of
A· j .
With AIDS singles and linear technology, the couple’s quantity demand for
good k is
hk(p/y) =
;
j
Ak j


η
π j
r
α fj + 
f
j lnπ + β
f
j
d
ln (η)− c f (π)
es
+
1−η
π j
r
αmj + mj lnπ + βmj
d
ln (1− η)− cm (π)
es

+ ak
hk(p/y) =
b
y − a) p
c;
j
Ak j


η
r
1
A· j p
sr
α fj + 
f
j ln
r
Ap
y−a) p
s
+ β fj
K
ln (η)− c f
r
Ap
y−a) p
sLs
+ (1− η)
r
1
A· j p
s

 α
m
j + mj ln
r
Ap
y−a) p
s
+βmj
K
ln (1− η)− cm
r
Ap
y−a) p
sL



+ak
Given hk(p/y) for each good k, the constants ak are identified as the intercept
terms, and we may identify the summation by [hk(p/y) − ak]/
b
y − a) p
c
. Now
use
ci (π) = ci
t
Ap
y − a) p
u
= (ln Ap))αi −
b
ln y − a) p
c
+
1
2
(ln (Ap)))i ln (Ap)
to write this summation term as
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;j
A jk
A· j p


η

α fj + 
f
j ln (Ap)+
β fj
d
ln (η)−
b
(ln Ap))α f −
b
ln y − a) p
c
+ 12(ln (Ap))) f ln (Ap)
ce

+ (1− η)

αmj + mj ln (Ap)+
βmj
d
ln (1− η)−
b
(ln Ap))αm −
b
ln y − a) p
c
+ 12(ln (Ap)))m ln (Ap)
ce



For each good k, the coefficient of ln y in this expression is
−
;
j
ηβ fj + (1− η) βmj3
((A(j/Akj)p(
where the summation is now over all goods j for which Akj is not equal to zero.
Variation in y therefore provides identification of the above expression for each
good k. Variation of p in the above expression for each k identifies
ηβ fj + (1− η) βmj
A(j/Akj
for triplets of goods j, k, ( having Akj /= 0 and A(j /= 0. The above expression
with ( = k identifies η, since βmj and β
f
j are identified from singles, and therefore
A(j/Akj is also identified. Define A(j = A(j/A j j and d j = A j j . Identification
of A(j/Akj implies identification of A(j for all j, (. What remains is to identify
each d j .
The term Akj/A· j p = 1/
3
((A(j/Akj )p( is identified for each j , which im-
plies based on the large summation term above that
η
r
α fj + 
f
j ln (Ap)+ β
f
j
d
ln (η)−
b
(ln Ap))α f + 12(ln (Ap))) f ln (Ap)
ces
+ (1− η)
r
αmj + mj ln (Ap)+ βmj
d
ln (1− η)−
b
(ln Ap))αm + 12(ln (Ap)))m ln (Ap)
ces
is identified for each good j . The component of this expression that is quadratic
in ln (Ap) is
ln (Ap))
t
−ηβ fj
1
2
 f − (1− η) βmj
1
2
m
u
ln (Ap)
=
;
k
;
(
ln
;
j
d j Akj p j

ln
;
j
d j A(j p j

ϕk(
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where ϕk( and Akj are already identified for all j, k, (. Variation in p in this
expression then identifies d j , which completes the identification.
Note that the technology and sharing rule are substantially overidentified.
Given the demands of singles, the couple’s demands for each good k separately
identify η, a (from the y − a) p term) and A(j/Akj for all j, k, ( having Akj /= 0.
Therefore, observing couple’s demands for all goods, not just one, greatly overi-
dentifies these terms. In particular, if the k)th row of A has all nonzero elements,
then (given the demands of singles) the technology and the sharing rule can be
completely identified just by observing couple’s demands for the k)th good. In
addition to the overidentification resulting from observing the couple’s demands
for multiple goods, only the terms involving the intercept, the coefficient of ln y,
and the quadratic in ln (Ap) were used for identification, so all the other terms in
the couple’s demands, such as the linear in ln (Ap) term, provide additional overi-
dentifying restrictions. These various overidentifying assumptions may be used to
relax the assumptions regarding unequal and nonzero parameters in the statement
of Theorem 3.
Similarly, the above proof applies when single’s have QUAIDS demands,
since in that case the only difference in the model is the addition of more terms (in
particular, a quadratic in ln y) which provide more overidentifying restrictions.
Nonparametric Identification
We now show that, given only the observable Marshallian demand functions
of singles and households, we can in general recover the private good equiva-
lent functions xm and x f , the consumption technology F, and the sharing rule η,
without parameterizing any of these functions. As a result, applications that are
defined in terms of these functions, such as economies of scale to consumption
and adult equivalence scales, are also nonparametrically identified.
Given observed demand functions, if the technology function F and sharing
rule η are identified, then it immediately follows that all of the features of the
model are identified. The goal is therefore to establish nonparametric identifica-
tion of F and η. Let ρ = p/y and let PF be the space of increasing C2 functions
with range and domain equal to the positive orthant, and let Pη be the space of
C2 functions with domain equal to the positive orthant and range (0, 1). Define a
mapping T by the following procedure. Take some element (F, η) ∈ PF × Pη,
and treat F, η as if they were the true technology function and sharing rule by first
defining x(ρ) = F−1[h(ρ)] and Hπ(ρ) = DF(x)).ρ evaluated at x = x(ρ). Next
let π(ρ) = Hπ(ρ)/[Hπ(ρ))x(ρ)] and xm(ρ) = hm[π(ρ)/(1 − η(ρ))] (as an aside,
note these equations demonstrate that if the true F, η is known then the other fea-
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tures of the model such as shadow prices and private good equivalents are also
identified) Now define the function (HF,Hη) = T bF, ηc by
HF [x (ρ)] = h (ρ)
Hη(ρ) = C f [U f [x(ρ)− xm(ρ)], π(ρ)]
where C f (U f , π) is the cost function that corresponds to the utility functionU f .
This construction ofHη(ρ) does not depend on the choice of cardinalization forU f ,
as can be seen by equivalently expressingHη(ρ) in terms of Marshallian demand
functions as the solution to x(ρ) − xm(ρ) = h f
d
π(ρ)/Hη(ρ)
e
. The true tech-
nology function and sharing rule pair F, η are then a fixed point of the mapping
(HF,Hη) = T bF, ηc. In general, T might not be a contraction mapping, and so may
have several fixed points. However, for suitably regular demand functions (those
for which the tangent application to T is Fredholm) each fixed point will be lo-
cally unique as a consequence of Smale’s generalized transversality theorem. This
provides local generic identification. Regularity conditions such as monotonicity
and domain constraints further restrict the set of feasible functions solutions F, η.
Global identification results if only one fixed point is present or if, among all fixed
points, only one satisfies the required regularity conditions.
The above paragraph describes formally what we mean by ’generic’ identifi-
cation. A similar case of generic identification appears in Chiappori and Ekeland
(1999). Informally, the existence of the mapping T shows that a sufficient num-
ber of demand functions are identified to generally permit recovery of F and η, so
these functions will be identified as long as the demand functions are not too sim-
ple. An illustration of this point are the results provided earlier, which show that
a linear technology is not identified if the member’s demand equations are also
linear (specifically, the linear expenditure system), but are identified for nonlinear
member demands like the Almost Ideal or QUAIDS.
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Figure 1: QAIDS fits for singles and couples.
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Figure 2: Model fits for singles and couples.
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